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Abstract: Magnus and Callender (2004) argue that we ought to focus on retail arguments, 
which are arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical entities, as 
opposed to theoretical entities in general. However, scientists are the ones who put 
forward retail arguments, and it’s unclear how philosophers can engage with such 
arguments. We argue that philosophers can engage with retail arguments by providing 
criteria that they must satisfy in order to demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities. 
We put forward experimental individuation as such a criterion—when scientists 
experimentally individuate an entity, a realist conclusion about that entity is warranted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Magnus and Callender argue that we ought to abandon “wholesale arguments,” which are 
“arguments about all or most of the entities posited in our best scientific theories” (2004, 
321). Instead, we ought to embrace “retail arguments,” which are “arguments about 
specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance” (2004, 321). This shift in focus 
rules out standard scientific realism as well as various antirealist positions, and in Section 
2, we’ll argue that Magnus and Callender’s position is preferable to these other positions. 
However, we recognize that philosophers who choose to abandon wholesale 
arguments in favor of retail arguments face a potential problem. Dicken (2013) has 
argued that such philosophers will merely end up repeating the retail arguments that 
scientists offer. In that case, the turn to retail arguments may entail that no distinctively 
philosophical work remains to be done. In Section 3, we’ll argue that this is not the case. 
Not all retail arguments successfully demonstrate the existence of theoretical entities, and 
it can take some philosophical work to distinguish the ones that do from the ones that 
don’t. 
In Section 4, we’ll put forward a criterion for doing so, which we take from 
Chen’s (2016) work on experimental individuation. Chen suggests that “[i]f a scientist 
can realize the individuality of an object in a particular experiment, then she has provided 
the strongest evidence ... to warrant the reality of the object” (2016, 365). We’ll argue 
that retail arguments that demonstrate the experimental individuation of a theoretical 
entity succeed in showing that realism about that entity is warranted. 
We’ll draw on three examples throughout the paper: Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of 
acidity, J. J. Thomson’s work on cathode rays, and Davy’s discovery of potassium. We’ll 
conclude, in Section 5, by applying our criterion to these three cases, with the result that 
the upshot of a retail argument can be either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding 
the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. 
 
2. The Turn to Retail Arguments 
 
We’ll now introduce Magnus and Callender’s position in a bit more detail, and indicate 
why we take it to be preferable to standard scientific realism (SSR) and antirealism. SSR 
is a position regarding theories in general—the success of our best theories warrants the 
claim that they are at least approximately true, as well as the claim that the theoretical 
entities that they posit exist. Antirealist positions come in a number of different forms, 
but they all typically endorse claims about theories in general, and deny that success 
warrants the two claims endorsed by proponents of SSR. 
According to Magnus and Callender, there is something that all of these positions 
have in common, namely, their proponents attempt to support these positions by engaging 
in wholesale arguments. They focus on two examples of such arguments. First of all, 
there is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of our best theories 
would be a miracle if those theories weren’t at least approximately true. Secondly, there 
is the pessimistic meta-induction, which uses past successful-but-false theories as an 
inductive basis for concluding that our current successful theories are false as well. The 
no-miracles argument is taken to support “[w]holesale realism,” which “seeks to explain 
the success of science in general”; and the pessimistic meta-induction is taken to support 
“wholesale anti-realism,” which “seeks to explain the history of science in general” 
(2004, 321). However, Magnus and Callender argue that these arguments, and wholesale 
arguments in general, ought to be abandoned. This is because they embody the base rate 
fallacy, since they don’t take into account the base rate probability of any successful 
theory being true or false. For this reason, they maintain that wholesale realism and 
wholesale antirealism ought to be abandoned as well. 
Magnus and Callender propose that we ought to replace wholesale arguments 
with retail arguments. Unlike wholesale arguments, the scope of a retail argument is 
restricted to a particular theory and/or a particular kind of theoretical entity. By shifting 
the focus from theories in general to theories in particular, philosophers can dissolve the 
traditional realism debate, with the result that “realism and anti-realism are options to be 
exercised sometimes here and sometimes there” (2004, 337). This, in turn, opens up the 
possibility that “[t]here may be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist 
about top quarks, and so on” (2004, 333). 
In order to show why this possibility represents an improvement over SSR and 
antirealism, we’ll now consider a case from the history of chemistry. This case concerns 
the composition of hydrochloric acid. Scheele was the first to decompose this acid, which 
he called “acid of salt,” and he identified its constituent substances as phlogiston and 
“dephlogisticated acid of salt” (1774/1931). However, it was a matter of some 
controversy whether he had succeeded in decomposing hydrochloric acid. According to 
Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity, all acids are composed of oxygen (the principle of 
acidity) and a radical, which can be either a simple substance or a compound (1789/1965, 
65, 115). Neither Scheele nor any other chemist had been able to extract the oxygen from 
hydrochloric acid, which Lavoisier called “muriatic acid.”  And so Lavoisier held that it 
remained undecomposed, and, in accordance with his theory, he hypothesized that it must 
contain oxygen combined with what he called “the muriatic radical” (1789/1965, 71-72). 
As for Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt, Lavoisier held that it is a compound of 
muriatic acid and oxygen, which he called “oxygenated muriatic acid” (1789/1965, 73). 
Some years later, Davy argued that Scheele was correct, while Lavoisier was in error 
(1810, 236-37). On Davy’s view, muriatic acid is composed of hydrogen and what he 
calls “oxymuriatic acid,” which is what Lavoisier called “oxygenated muriatic acid,” and 
what Scheele called “dephlogisticated acid of salt.”  Davy later went on to argue for the 
elementary nature of this latter substance, and proposed a new name for it: “Chlorine” 
(1811, 32). His approval of Scheele stems from the fact that Davy, like a number of 
latter-day phlogiston theorists, identified hydrogen with phlogiston.1  And the claim that 
hydrochloric acid is made up of hydrogen and dephlogisticated acid of salt, even if 
terminologically problematic, is essentially correct. Lavoisier, however, was in error 
since this acid contains no oxygen, thus falsifying his oxygen theory of acidity. 
Proponents of SSR, impressed by narratives of the Chemical Revolution 
according to which Lavoisier’s oxygen theory defeated the phlogiston theory, are often 
explicit that their realism applies to the oxygen theory but not to the phlogiston theory.2  
But in that case, SSR entails the implausible conclusion that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical 
exists, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated acid of salt does not. It seems much better to 																																																								
1 See, e.g., Kirwan (1789, 4-5). 
2 See, e.g., Hardin and Rosenberg (1982, 610) and Psillos (1999, 291). 
conclude that Lavoisier’s muriatic radical doesn’t exist, while Scheele’s dephlogisticated 
acid of salt does. 
Antirealism, at least of the Kuhnian variety, fares no better. Those influenced by 
Kuhn’s (1962/1996) views regarding incommensurability would claim that theoretical 
entities conceptualized by rival theories should be treated as different entities. However, 
chemists working in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shared a set of 
operations for producing the substance that was variously known as dephlogisticated acid 
of salt, oxymuriatic acid, and chlorine. It’s therefore implausible to maintain that, in light 
of the fact that these chemists held different theories, they were working with distinct 
theoretical entities. A trans-theoretical view of the substance that came to be known as 
chlorine is therefore preferable. 
By abandoning wholesale arguments in favor of retail arguments, we can sidestep 
these difficulties, and simply adopt realism about chlorine (whatever it was called and 
however it was conceptualized) and antirealism about Lavoisier’s muriatic radical. That 
said, by trading wholesale arguments for retail arguments, we face another difficulty, to 
which we’ll now turn. 
 
3. Can Philosophers Engage with Retail Arguments? 
 
Dicken (2013) has objected that those who abandon wholesale arguments in favor of 
retail arguments face a serious difficulty. In short, once one does so, it’s not clear that any 
“distinctively philosophical” issues remain to be addressed (2013, 564). Scientists are 
generally the ones who put forward retail arguments. And if the turn to retail arguments 
amounts to merely repeating arguments scientists have offered first, then perhaps nothing 
distinctively philosophical remains to be done. Our goal in the remainder of the paper is 
to provide a way of engaging with retail arguments that is distinctively philosophical, and 
to thereby answer Dicken’s objection. 
We’ll start by considering how scientists demonstrate the existence of theoretical 
entities, and so we’ll now introduce another case from the history of science. This case 
concerns Thomson’s work on cathode rays and his determination of the mass-to-charge 
ratio (m/e) of the electron. According to the official website of the Nobel Prize, it was 
because of this work that Thomson “received the Nobel Prize in 1906 for the discovery of 
the electron, the first elementary particle.”3 Thomson (1897, 1906/1967) hypothesized 
that cathode rays are currents of “carriers of negative electricity” or “corpuscles”—what 
we now know as electrons.4 His hypothesis was not only about the nature of cathode rays, 
but also about the interaction among cathode rays and other theoretical entities such as 
electrostatic fields and electrons. In order to determine the mass-to-charge ratio, he 
measured the deflection of cathode rays passing through an electrostatic field, the 
strength of the electrostatic field, and other related magnitudes. He interpreted the value 
that he obtained for m/e in light of his hypothesis, and his experimental results confirmed 
that hypothesis. 																																																								
3 Retrieved January 27, 2016 from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/vacuum/experiment-1.html. See also 
Harré (2002) and Whittaker (1989). 
4 For the identification of Thomson’s carriers with electrons, see the reprint of Thomson 
(1897) in Magie (1969), in which Magie makes the identification. 
However, one might ask how it’s possible to infer from Thomson’s experimental 
confirmation of his hypothesis to the claim that he had thereby demonstrated the 
existence of the electron. Philosophers can engage with such a question. And regardless 
of the answers they provide, they must at least defend those answers by invoking some 
kind of criterion for concluding that the evidence that scientists have offered does or does 
not constitute a demonstration of the existence of a given entity. To take one example of 
such a criterion, Hacking (1983, 23) suggests manipulation: “if you can spray them then 
they are real.”  While Thomson manipulated cathode rays, he did not manipulate 
electrons, and so, according to Hacking’s criterion, Thomson did not offer evidence 
strong enough to demonstrate the existence of electrons. 
The important point, for our purposes, is that providing a criterion for granting the 
reality of a theoretical entity, and determining whether the evidence that scientists have 
offered satisfies that criterion, constitutes a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments. Scientists may be the ones who initially put forward retail arguments. But it is 
a distinctively philosophical task to determine a criterion that can distinguish those retail 
arguments that demonstrate the existence of a theoretical entity from those that do not. 
We thus have a way of answering Dicken’s objection, provided that, by invoking such a 
criterion, we are not thereby turning back to wholesale arguments. In the next section, 
we’ll introduce our criterion and argue that applying it does not amount to a wholesale 
argument. 
 
4. Ontological Commitment and Experimental Individuation 
 
Our proposed criterion for granting the reality of theoretical entities is experimental 
individuation. A retail argument that demonstrates the experimental individuation of an 
entity is a good argument for realism about that entity. 
Individuation and ontological commitment are connected. When scientists are 
ontologically committed to the theoretical entities that they posit, this commitment 
involves not just a belief that the entities exist, but also a responsibility to demonstrate 
their existence. Demonstrating the existence of a posited entity requires scientists to find 
an individual instance or sample of that entity, and if a scientist posits a theoretical entity 
without individuating it, then her ontological commitment is empty. 
How do scientists individuate theoretical entities? Answering this question 
requires us to distinguish theoretical individuation from experimental individuation. 
Scientists theoretically individuate an entity if, in the course of theorizing, they describe a 
set of properties and behaviors of a posited entity by which they can identify it and 
distinguish it from other entities. However, these descriptions by which scientists 
theoretically individuate entities require evidence. Scientists can offer evidence for the 
existence of a theoretical entity if they produce an instance or sample of such an entity by 
performing an experiment. In doing so, they individuate an entity experimentally.5 
The relationship between theoretical individuation and experimental individuation 
is much the same as the relationship between theory and experiment more generally. 																																																								
5 Scientists may also individuate an entity observationally, by observing an instance or 
sample of such an entity. Since observation is itself a complex issue, and since 
participants in the realism debate rarely question the existence of entities that scientists 
have observed, we will not discuss observational individuation here. 
Various worries about the theory-ladenness of experimentation are relevant here. If a 
theoretical hypothesis yields a prediction regarding some experimental result, the result 
may be interpreted in light of the hypothesis. Moreover, since a theoretical hypothesis 
may involve two or more theoretical entities and their interactions, it can be difficult to 
show that an experiment produces an instance or sample of the target entity, i.e., that it 
experimentally individuates that entity. And it can be difficult to judge whether an 
experiment produces a real individual, as opposed to a mere phenomenon that results 
from experimental apparatuses and their interactions with experimented objects. For 
these reasons, a criterion of experimental individuation that is sufficiently independent of 
theoretical interpretation is needed.  
Is there such a criterion for experimental individuation? One candidate is 
Hacking’s manipulation criterion, which we mentioned in Section 3. However, since 
experimenters can manipulate not just real individuals, but also mere phenomena, 
manipulation cannot singly serve as the criterion of experimental individuation. Chen 
(2016) takes Hacking’s criterion of manipulation, along with two other criteria, namely, 
separation and maintenance of structural unity, as jointly constituting a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the experimental individuation of a theoretical entity. In short, 
experiments that produce individuals are experiments that separate individuals from their 
surrounding environment, manipulate them, and maintain their structural unity 
throughout the process. Importantly, Chen’s further conditions ensure that the 
manipulated object is a real individual as opposed to a mere phenomenon. We take 
Chen’s criteria to offer a satisfactory account of experimental individuation. In Section 5, 
we’ll illustrate his criteria in terms of three retail arguments from the history of science, 
and thereby provide some support for our claim that his criteria are satisfactory. 
For now, we wish to emphasize two points. First of all, experimental 
individuation is our proposed criterion for determining whether a retail argument 
successfully demonstrates the existence of some theoretical entity—it succeeds if it 
demonstrates the experimental individuation of that entity. Secondly, Chen’s three 
criteria provide an adequate account of what experimental individuation requires. 
Before moving on, we’ll discuss two potential problems with this proposal. First 
of all, some theoretical entities, like the chemical substances named by mass terms like 
‘water,’ ‘phlogiston,’ and ‘oxygen,’ are paradigm cases of non-individuals. It’s therefore 
not immediately obvious how we can appeal to the notion of experimental individuation 
when it comes to such entities. We propose to do so by considering the experimental 
individuation of samples of such substances, as we’ll illustrate in Section 5.1, in terms of 
Davy’s discovery of potassium. Since samples count as individuals, our criterion is 
applicable to cases involving non-individuals like chemical substances. 
Secondly, there’s the issue as to whether the application of our criterion amounts 
to a kind of wholesale argument. Whether a given retail argument demonstrates the 
experimental individuation of some theoretical entity is a local matter, grounded in the 
details of that argument. In contrast, wholesale arguments are not grounded in such local 
matters. Instead, they rely on claims regarding populations of theories in general, and it is 
for this reason that they embody the base rate fallacy. We’ve consciously avoided 
reasoning that may lead to the base rate fallacy. For example, we haven’t argued that the 
success of our best theories would be a miracle unless the entities they posit can be 
experimentally individuated. For these reasons, the application of our criterion to retail 
arguments does not amount to a kind of wholesale argument. And in that case, we’ve 
provided a way of answering Dicken’s objection, since our criterion provides a way for 
philosophers to engage with retail arguments. 
 
5. Application of the Criterion to Three Retail Arguments 
 
Our goal at this point is to show how one can use the criterion we’ve proposed in order to 
engage with retail arguments regarding the existence of particular kinds of theoretical 
entities. We’ll discuss three cases: Davy’s potassium, Lavoisier’s muriatic radical, and 
Thomson’s electron. 
 
5.1 A Realist Conclusion Regarding Davy’s Potassium 
 
To begin with, we’ll argue that Davy demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
potassium, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument for realism about 
that substance. 
 Davy first isolated potassium by decomposing potash, which he did by means of 
electrolysis (1808, 4-5). He was the first to decompose potash, though for some time, 
chemists suspected it to be a compound.6  Davy acted on a small piece of moistened 
potash with a Voltaic battery. As a result, at the negative surface of the battery Davy 
observed the appearance of “small globules having a high metallic lustre, and being 
precisely similar in visible characters to quicksilver” (1808, 5). In the lecture in which he 																																																								
6 See, e.g., Lavoisier (1965/1789, 156). 
reports these results, Davy goes on to write: “These globules, numerous experiments soon 
shewed to be the substance I was in search of, and a peculiar inflammable principle the 
basis of potash” (1808, 5). And later in the lecture, he proposes the name “Potasium 
[sic]” for the basis of potash (1808, 32). 
 While this experiment, on its own, does not demonstrate the experimental 
individuation of a sample of potassium, subsequent experiments that Davy conducted do, 
and he shows that potassium satisfies all three of Chen’s criteria. First of all, there is 
Chen’s separation condition: scientists must separate the entities that they produce “from 
their environments” (2016, 348), and “from the experimental instruments that may have 
helped produce [them]” (2016, 365). In order to determine whether his results depended 
on the platinum instruments that he used, Davy performed a number of experiments using 
a variety of other materials, including copper, silver, and gold (1808, 5). And in order to 
determine whether his results depended on the fact that he conducted his experiments in 
the open atmosphere, he performed similar experiments in a vacuum (1808, 5). In all of 
these cases, he obtained the same results. These experiments collectively show that Davy 
had separated potassium from its surrounding environment (including the atmosphere and 
the other components of potash), and from the instruments that he used, thereby 
satisfying Chen’s separation condition. 
 Secondly, there is Chen’s condition regarding the maintenance of structural unity. 
Chen understands structural unity as the idea that “the components of an individual are 
structured into a whole in some specific manner” (2016, 358). Davy encountered a 
number of difficulties when it came to maintaining the structural unity of the globules of 
potassium that he had produced because “they acted more or less upon almost every body 
to which they were exposed” (1808, 10). One of the first things Davy notes about the 
globules is that they did not last long—the ones that did not explode immediately after 
forming soon lost their metallic luster and became “covered by a white film” (1808, 5). 
Davy identifies this film as pure potash, and explains how it attracts moisture from the 
atmosphere, converting the globule into a saturated solution of potash (1808, 7). 
Eventually, Davy discovered one substance on which potassium did not have much of an 
effect, namely, recently distilled naphtha (1808, 10). He used that fluid to preserve 
globules of potassium, and he was able to examine the properties of potassium in the 
atmosphere by covering the globules with a thin film of naphtha. This method allowed 
Davy to maintain the structural unity of potassium, thus satisfying Chen’s condition. 
 Thirdly, there is Chen’s manipulation condition. Chen understands this condition in 
terms of the “instrumental use” of an object “to investigate other phenomena of nature” 
(2016, 358). Towards the end of the lecture in which he reports the electrolytic 
decomposition of potash, Davy conjectures that the globules of potassium he isolated 
“will undoubtedly prove powerful agents for analysis; and having an affinity for oxygene 
[sic] stronger than any other known substances, they may possibly supersede the 
application of electricity to some of the undecompounded bodies” (1808, 44). Making 
good on this conjecture would amount to showing that chemists can use potassium to 
decompose previously undecomposed substances, thereby satisfying Chen’s manipulation 
condition. And in the following year, Davy made good on this conjecture by using 
potassium to extract the oxygen from a previously undecomposed substance, namely, 
boracic acid, thereby decomposing it (1809, 76-77). 
 In sum, Davy shows that samples of potassium satisfy all three of Chen’s criteria. 
And by demonstrating the experimental individuation of these samples, Davy presents us 
with a successful retail argument for realism about potassium. 
 
5.2 An Antirealist Conclusion Regarding Lavoisier’s Muriatic Radical 
 
We’ll now argue that Davy shows why the experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s 
muriatic radical is not possible, and thereby provides us with a successful retail argument 
for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
As we discussed in Section 2, Lavoisier hypothesized that hydrochloric acid, 
which he called muriatic acid, is composed of oxygen and a hypothetical substance that 
he called the muriatic radical. He thereby theoretically individuated the muriatic radical 
as that substance which combines with oxygen to form muriatic acid, which, in turn, is 
converted into oxymuriatic acid (i.e., chlorine) by means of combining with even more 
oxygen. But as we emphasized in Section 4, theoretical individuation is a mere belief, 
and beliefs require evidence. 
Davy (1810, 235-36) provides a retail argument that demonstrates that the 
experimental individuation of Lavoisier’s radical is not possible. He emphasizes the 
results of various experiments that he and other chemists performed, which show that 
oxymuriatic acid combines with hydrogen to form muriatic acid. And he goes on to 
discuss those experiments that seem to show the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid into 
oxygen and muriatic acid. Davy observes that in these experiments, water is always 
present. And he concludes that the oxygen that such experiments produce results from the 
decomposition of the water, not from the decomposition of oxymuriatic acid, which has 
not been demonstrated. If oxymuriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen, and muriatic acid 
contains oxymuriatic acid and hydrogen, then muriatic acid doesn’t contain oxygen 
either. To adopt Davy’s later terminology, the only components of muriatic acid are 
hydrogen and chlorine. Experimentally individuating the muriatic radical would involve 
separating it from the oxygen with which it combines to form muriatic acid and 
oxymuriatic acid. And since Davy showed that this is not possible, he gives us a 
successful retail argument for antirealism about Lavoisier’s radical. 
 
5.3 A Skeptical Conclusion Regarding Thomson’s Electron 
 
Finally, we’ll argue that Thomson neither demonstrates the experimental individuation of 
the electron, nor shows that it is impossible. Hence, we have an example of an 
inconclusive retail argument. The proper response to such an argument is skepticism 
regarding the entity in question, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument 
regarding the existence of that entity. 
Thomson (1897) designed a new type of cathode ray tube (figure 1) to perform a 
deflection experiment.  
 
 
Figure 1. Thomson’s cathode ray tube in 1897. Reproduced from Thomson 1969, 586. 
 
This tube contains a cathode C, a cylindrical anode A with a slit, a cylindrical metal ring 
B with a slit, and a pair of plates D and E that produce an electrostatic field. A cathode 
ray is produced when the cathode discharges, and the ray passes through the slits in A and 
B before passing through the electrostatic field produced by D and E. Thomson’s goal 
was to determine whether the ray would be deflected in the field, and to thereby 
determine the composition of cathode rays. The basic idea was that, if cathode rays were 
made of ethereal waves, the rays would not be deflected by an electrostatic field; if, 
however, the rays were made up of negatively electrified bodies, then the rays would be 
deflected by an electrostatic field. 
Thomson’s thought was that a cathode would produce both electric currents and 
cathode rays when discharging, and that, in order to determine the composition of 
cathode rays, it would be necessary to eliminate the electric currents and experiment with 
purified cathode rays. Purification is the function of the cylindrical metal ring B, which 
absorbs the electric currents leaked from A and thus ensures that the ray passing through 
B is pure. Thomson found that the purified cathode ray was deflected when it passed 
between the plates D and E, thus confirming that cathode rays are made up of negatively 
electrified bodies. 
While Thomson satisfies Chen’s criteria when it comes to cathode rays, he didn’t 
thereby experimentally individuate the electrons that make them up. Thomson succeeded 
in separating cathode rays from currents; purifying them with the metal ring B, and thus 
maintaining their structural unity; and manipulating them by deflecting them with an 
electrostatic field. According to Chen’s criteria, one can say that Thomson 
experimentally individuated cathode rays and demonstrated that they are currents of 
negative electricity. But Thomson presupposed rather than demonstrated that the currents 
consist of electrons. He did not demonstrate the existence of electrons, because he did not 
experimentally individuate them. Hence, the proper response to the retail argument that 
Thomson gives us is neither realism nor antirealism, but rather skepticism regarding the 
existence of electrons, at least until there is a conclusive retail argument. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our goal in this paper has been to provide a way for philosophers to engage with retail 
arguments, and thereby show that, even if we dissolve the traditional realism debate, 
there is still philosophical work to be done. We’ve put forward the criterion of 
experimental individuation in order to determine whether a given retail argument 
demonstrates the existence of a particular kind of theoretical entity. And we’ve applied 
that criterion to three cases, with the result that the upshot of a retail argument can be 
either realism, antirealism, or skepticism regarding the existence of a particular kind of 
theoretical entity. 
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